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Executive Summary
Since April 1998, the Vienna-based UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Commission
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has been negotiating the draft Protocol Against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition
(hereafter referred to as the Firearms Protocol). This Protocol will be the first global measure
regulating international transfers of small arms and light weapons, and should have a tremendous
impact on both the legal and the illicit manufacture and trade in firearms.
The draft agreement seeks to combat and criminalise trafficking in firearms, through the
development of harmonised international standards governing the manufacture, possession
and transfer of commercial shipments of these weapons. While the final outcome of the
Protocol relies on the outcome of negotiations in February 2001, the draft agreement contains
provisions which commit states, among other things, to:
l Adopt legislative measures to criminalise the illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession
and use of firearms;
l Maintain detailed records on the import, export and in-transit movements of firearms;
l Adopt an international system for marking firearms at the time of manufacture and each
time they are imported;
l Establish a harmonised licensing system governing the import, export, in-transit
movement and re-export of firearms;
l Exchange information regarding authorised producers, dealers, importers and exporters,
the routes used by illicit traffickers, best practice in combating trafficking in order to
enhance states ability to prevent, detect and investigate illicit trafficking;
l Co-operate at the bilateral, regional and international level to prevent, combat and
eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms; and
l Consider developing systems to require arms brokers, traders and forwarders 
to register and obtain licences for their transactions.
The Protocol places a premium on international co-operation, information exchange and
transparency. The provisions in the Firearms Protocol are an important complement to those
being developed for the UN 2001 Conference. Issues such as improving the ability to trace
small arms and light weapons through effective marking systems, regulating the activities 
of arms brokers and building international norms on the responsible disposal of surplus small
arms are common to both initiatives.
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While it is important that the 2001 Conference develop its own programme of action, it should
seek to build on the international norms and standards which have been developed during
the course of the Protocol negotiations. For example, states should focus on developing the
following concrete measures:
l Agreeing parallel controls on marking, licensing and record-keeping for 
state-to-state transactions;
l Pursuing legally binding controls on arms brokers, traders and forwarders;
l Agreeing on a norm of destruction of seizures of illicit weapons; and
l Reviewing the prospects for ratification and implementation of the Protocol.
The signing of the UN Firearms Protocol will not be the panacea to all the problems associated
with small arms proliferation and misuse. Complementary measures, which embed small arms
control within the context of human security, security sector reform, post-conflict reconstruction
and long-term sustainable development must be pursued. The UN 2001 Conference thus will
be an important opportunity to add another element to the comprehensive framework necessary
for effective global action to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.
4Introduction
The UN 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
has become a primary focus for international action on small arms proliferation and misuse,
attracting widespread attention from policy-makers and NGOs alike. However, since April 1998,
another UN body has been negotiating a legally binding international agreement on
preventing the illicit trafficking of firearms in relative obscurity.
In the past two years, the Vienna-based UN Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC)
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has been busy negotiating the Revised
draft Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition (hereafter referred to as the Firearms Protocol).1 The Firearms
Protocol, a supplement to the July 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
is expected be finalised during 2001.2 If agreed, this Protocol will be the first global measure
regulating international transfers of small arms and light weapons, and should have a
tremendous impact on both the legal and the illicit manufacture and trade in firearms.3
In diplomatic terms, the Firearms Protocol negotiations developed at lightning speed, quickly
garnering high-level political support from a diverse group of states. Following a resolution
passed at the ECOSOC Crime Commission in April 1998, an ad hoc committee was tasked
with negotiating a legally binding international agreement to combat trafficking in firearms.4
Thirty months on, officials close to the process remain cautiously optimistic that the
Protocol will be successfully concluded in the final negotiation session scheduled for
February 2001.
Given the potential impact of the Firearms Protocol, it is important that officials involved 
in the UN 2001 Conference are fully aware of the policy choices that need to be made 
as UN Member States reach the final stages of negotiation. Whatever the outcomes of the
negotiations, the Protocol will have a significant impact on the illicit trafficking of firearms 
and it should complement the outcomes of the UN 2001 Conference. This briefing analyses
common areas between the Protocol and the UN 2001 Conference, and identifies ways 
to ensure that the two initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing.5
5The Purpose and Scope of the Firearms Protocol
The stated purpose of the Protocol is to promote co-operation among States Parties in order
to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts
and components and ammunition.6 The draft agreement seeks to combat and criminalise
trafficking in firearms, through the development of harmonised international standards governing
the manufacture, possession and transfer of commercial shipments of these weapons. 
While many of the articles of the Protocol have been finalised, until the Protocol is agreed 
in its entirety the final outcomes still hang in the balance. The draft agreement contains
provisions which commit states to:
l Adopt legislative measures to criminalise the illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession
and use of firearms;
l Maintain detailed records on the import, export and in-transit movements of firearms;
l Adopt an international system for marking firearms at the time of manufacture and each
time they are imported;
l Establish a harmonised licensing system governing the import, export, in-transit movement
and re-export of firearms;
l Prevent the theft, loss or diversion of firearms through the strengthening of export controls,
export points and border controls;
l Exchange information regarding authorised producers, dealers, importers and exporters,
the routes used by illicit traffickers, best practice in combating trafficking in order to enhance
states’ ability to prevent, detect and investigate illicit trafficking; 
l Cooperate at the bilateral, regional and international level to prevent, combat and eradicate
the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms;
l Exchange experience and provide training and technical assistance in areas such 
as identification and tracing of firearms and intelligence gathering; and 
l Establishing a system to require arms brokers, traders and forwarders to register and
obtain licences for their transactions.
The Protocol places a premium on international cooperation, information exchange and
transparency. The importance of these principles is consistently emphasised by many officials
involved in the negotiations, who argue that in order to identify the illegal trade, states must
first establish what is legal. By increasing cooperation and information exchange, the Protocol
will enable governments to effectively identify trafficking routes, and build a clearer understanding
of the nature and scope of the problem. The development of harmonised marking, licensing
and record-keeping systems will help law enforcement and customs officials to distinguish
legal from illegal shipments of firearms. In many regions of conflict, where the lines between
legal and illegal transfers are increasingly blurred, these distinctions will be especially valuable.
However, the controls outlined in the current draft of the Protocol have one central limitation
– they exempt state-to-state transactions or transactions for national security.7 Critics of the
agreement argue that the limited mandate of the Protocol maintains the status quo and does
nothing to question current government policies or practices. Its ‘law enforcement’ approach
may have generated a high degree of international consensus but it merely reinforces and
strengthens laws and procedures that already exist in many states, and does nothing to address,
explicitly, the continued transfer of small arms and light weapons by governments to conflict
and human-rights crisis-zones. It is imperative that this dimension is not overlooked by the 
UN 2001 Conference.
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The Firearms Protocol will clarify and address many aspects of the illicit trade in small arms
and light weapons. Thus, the outcomes of the Protocol negotiations will undoubtedly influence
the agenda and outcomes of the UN 2001 Conference. However, whilst the draft Protocol
contains many detailed and effective provisions for developing harmonised international
standards for controlling trafficking in firearms, some of the most critical aspects of the
agreement remain unresolved. Many of the key sticking points will affect how broad or narrow
the scope of the Protocol will be. States remain divided on whether this agreement should
focus tightly on illicit trafficking by organised criminals in the narrowest sense, in line with the
mandate of the umbrella convention, or whether the agreement should address the impact 
of trafficking in conflict situations and civil society.
States that have called for a more comprehensive approach argue that these negotiations
provided an invaluable opportunity to develop legally binding controls to prevent trafficking 
of firearms in the context of both crime and conflict. Others claimed that ECOSOC is mandated
only to address trafficking within the context of organised crime. Preventing illicit trafficking 
in conflict situations, it is argued, is the remit of the UN 2001 Conference. However, the
Crime Convention adopts a broad interpretation of an organised criminal group, defining it 
as “a structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in
concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences… in order to obtain,
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”.8 This definition therefore enables
the Protocol to address many of the central dynamics of trafficking of firearms both in relation
to crime and conflict, and suggests that the obstacle to far-reaching controls lies in a lack of
political will rather than mandate problems.
Besides the problems of distinguishing between illicit trafficking of firearms in relation to crime
and conflict, there are other areas of the Firearms Protocol that are related to those under
discussion at the UN 2001 Conference; these are outlined below.
It is expected that the provisions outlined in the Protocol will apply only to commercially
traded firearms. State-to-state transactions and transfers for the purposes of national security
will not be subject to the same standards and controls.9 This exemption for state-authorised
transactions raises concerns that the Protocol institutionalises a double standard as governments
will not necessarily be bound by the same rules they set for their citizens. It further raises
questions of the practicality of such a system.
Logic dictates that all transfers, whether destined for the commercial market or government
forces, should be subject to the same standards. Indeed, many arms originally sold legally 
by states are diverted into the illicit market, blurring the line between the legal and illicit trade.
A considerable proportion of illicit weapons have been diverted from state arsenals to the
illicit market as a result of loss, theft or corruption. For example, so many weapons have been
stolen from Russian military and police storage facilities that every third illegally owned firearm
originates from Defence Ministry stocks.10 Therefore, the same standards of marking, licensing
and record-keeping should apply to both state authorised and commercial transfers in order
to facilitate effective identification of weapons that are ultimately traded illicitly.
Considerations for the UN 2001 Conference
The exemption for state-to-state transactions and transfers for the purposes of national security
is clearly a fundamental limitation of the Protocol. However, the Protocol is set to establish
high standards in areas of marking, licensing and record-keeping. The 2001 Conference
should therefore seek to build on the consensus reached during the Protocol negotiations
and develop concrete and ideally legally binding measures which apply the same standards
to government-authorised transactions.
The scope 
of the Protocol
The definition
of firearms 
Complementarity between the Protocol 
and the UN 2001 Conference
Throughout the Protocol negotiations, the definition of “firearm” has remained a key area of
controversy.11 While many states have argued for the adoption of a broad definition of firearms,
which would include many categories of small arms and light weapons, there is no consensus
on this definition. Two main obstacles have emerged to a broad definition of firearms. 
Firstly, some states have raised concerns that a broad definition of firearms – including larger
barrelled weapons, missile systems and rocket launchers – would extend beyond the mandate
of combating trafficking in the context of transnational organized crime, arguing that “such matters
[are] better left to negotiations and instruments dealing with disarmament matters”.12 However,
other states have argued that many organised criminal groups transfer and use these larger
weapons systems.13 By the same token a more restricted definition would exclude many
categories of small arms and light weapons frequently trafficked by criminals in regions
of conflict, thereby limiting the application of the Firearms Protocol in regions of instability
or post conflict reconstruction.
Secondly, states have raised concerns that a broad definition could pose significant obstacles
to the ratification and implementation of the Protocol, as it is unclear whether systems such
as grenades, rocket launchers or missiles could be subject to the same marking and tracing
provisions as barrelled weapons. However, as proposed by the delegation of the Netherlands,
it would be possible to utilise broad definition of firearms but limit the application of certain
provisions, such as marking, to barrelled weapons until an effective system was developed.14
Despite the reservations raised by some states, it is worth noting that the “Inter-American
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives, and Other Related Materials” agreed by the Organization of American States
(OAS) in 1997,15 upon which the Firearms Protocol is closely modelled, utilises an extremely
broad definition of firearms. Outlining the rationale for a broad definition of firearms, the Chair
of the negotiations, Mexican Ambassador Carmen Moreno, explained that “in the Hemisphere, …
there is illicit trafficking in all these weapons. We did not want to leave out of the convention
certain types of weapons and thereby give the impression that it would be tolerated if they
were traded illegally. We wanted to include everything.”16 Less than three years after the signing
of the OAS Convention, 10 Members States have ratified the agreement. This suggests that,
not withstanding certain reservations, a broad definition firearms is possible and practicable.
Considerations for the UN 2001 Conference
It is critical that the Protocol negotiators agree as broad a definition of firearms as possible.
The definition agreed by the 1997 UN Panel of Experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons
should be regarded as the reference point.17 A definition of “firearms” which excludes categories
of small arms and light weapons will be a major stumbling block to efforts to build upon the
progress made in the Protocol at the 2001 Conference. In particular, as the 2001 Conference
may focus on increasing controls and standards on state-authorised transactions, there is a very
real concern that commercial shipments of certain categories of small arms and light weapons
may fall between two stools – exempt from the Protocol and overlooked by the Conference.
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The draft Firearms Protocol contains detailed proposals for the marking of firearms at the
time of manufacture, as well as at every point of import, for the purposes of identifying 
and tracing weapons.18 This is one of the most important provisions within the agreement,
imposing accountability on manufacturers, suppliers, exporters and importers alike. 
However, while there appears to be an overriding consensus that there is a need to mark
firearms at the point of manufacture, the proposal to mark firearms at the point of import 
is questioned by some states. Although many delegations support the introduction of an
international system for marking firearms at import, some have raised concerns regarding
the costs and practicality of such a system. Additional reservations have been raised
regarding whether importer, exporters or governments agencies would be responsible for
applying import marks.19
Nonetheless, import marks are very important. Firearms often change hands many times before
reaching their final destination. After their original import, firearms are often re-exported either
through licit or illicit channels to criminals, arms brokers or parties to a conflict. Import marks
would facilitate the investigations of law enforcement officials seeking to identify when legally
manufactured and exported weapons entered the illicit market. Moreover, import marks will
identify second-hand firearms which have not been marked at the time of manufacture. 
Although marking is often regarded as a technological challenge, a recent study by the
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs suggests that an international system is feasible.
Based on an assessment of the costs and durability of various marking techniques, the report
recommends that firearms be marked on the “weapon frame or receiver using a combination
of stamping, engraving and casting techniques.”20 These methods are particularly effective in
“post-production application,” such as marking at the point of import.21 In addition, it appears that
the firearms industry, which has been studying the issue during the course of the negotiations,
now appear supportive of import marks on weapons.22
With negotiations now approaching the final hour, states must agree common standards 
on marking at manufacture and import. Given the fact that many of the reservations centre 
on practicalities rather principles, the 10 OAS Member States that have ratified their regional
Convention – which has detailed provision on marking at manufacture and import 
– should outline clear proposals for implementing this central aspect of the Protocol.
Considerations for the UN 2001 Conference
Discussions on marking and tracing are expected to high on the 2001 Conference agenda.
Indeed, the Governments of France and Switzerland have proposed that a decision is made
at the 2001 Conference to launch negotiations for a legally-binding international treaty to enhance
the trace-ability of flows of small arms and light weapons of concern. Since the Firearms
Protocol will establish legally-binding obligations for marking and record-keeping of firearms,
it will be important to ensure that such a treaty complements the Protocol and builds upon its
obligations rather than establishing different ones. For example, the Protocol is likely to include
requirements that all firearms must be marked at manufacture (including country of manufacture
and a unique serial number) and to establish a system for marking firearms each time they
are imported. Once concluded, the Protocol should therefore provide clear parameters for
the marking provisions of the treaty proposed in the French-Swiss initiative.
However, since the Protocol focuses on the problem of tracing firearms used in crime or
trafficked by transnational criminal organisations, an additional treaty designed to enhance
the tracing of arms flows that contribute to conflicts and to excessive and destabilising
accumulations of small arms would be welcome. It would provide an important element 
of the international action programme to be established at the 2001 Conference.
Marking
weapons at
manufacture
and import 
Arms brokers and shipping agents play a central role in the illicit trade in firearms. Arms brokering
agents thrive on the lack of international controls on their illicit activities by taking advantage
of the lax legislation that exists in many countries, arranging the transfer of arms from third
countries into regions of conflict and human-rights crisis-zones. Therefore, the proposal to include
provisions to register and license arms brokers is one of the aspects of the draft Protocol which
could have the most dramatic effect on illicit trafficking in both crime and conflict situations.
However, as finalised at its eleventh session, the article on brokers and brokering in the draft
Protocol only states that “States Parties that have not yet done so shall consider establishing
a system for regulating the activities of those who engage in brokering” and continues by
providing suggestions on the measures the system could contain. These include: requiring 
the registration of brokers operating within their territory; requiring licensing or authorisation of
brokering; or requiring disclosure on import and export license or authorisations, or accompanying
documents, of the names and locations of brokers involved in the transaction.
For states that already have a system in place, they are “encouraged” to exchange information
and retain records they have on brokers and brokering.  The experience of states that have
introduced legislation to control arms brokers, which suggests that the administration of such
systems has not been especially onerous, will be important for those states which will establish
systems under the Firearms Protocol. 
For example, between 1996 and 1999, the United States government is reported to have
registered 137 arms brokering agents and received approximately 200 applications.23 The Swiss
government has registered approximately 40 arms brokers and issued 30 licences since the
introduction of legislation in 1998.24 In Germany around 10 license applications are received
each year.25
The US provisions relating to registration of arms brokering agents, which require arms brokers
“to register with their country of nationality and with any country where the person acts as 
a broker”,26 are potentially the most effective on offer. Linking registration to the country of their
nationality creates an obligation that arms brokers will find hard to evade. The US provisions
requiring brokers to obtain a license for their transactions “from the country where the person
acts as a broker” are, however, less stringent and are liable to circumvention by arms brokers
who conduct their operations whilst continually on the move.27 The Swiss proposal to register
and license arms brokers in their country of residence has some merits, however the danger
exists that arms brokers will evade such controls by continually changing their residence.28
Analysis of known arms brokering activities suggests that arms brokers operate out of many
countries and deals are facilitated across many continents and that agents could avoid controls
based on residency or on country of operation.29 Applying controls according to the nationality
of the arms broker could restrict their ability to evade legislation.
It is also important that states adopt an inclusive definition of the activities which must be
controlled under this provision. A recent UN report identified arms retailers, wholesalers,
brokers and transport agents as all centrally involved in the illicit trade, thus all such activities
should therefore be bound by the controls outlined in this provision.30 Unlicensed and unregistered
arms brokering should be further established as a criminal offence under the Protocol and states
should be equipped with powers to maintain jurisdiction over nationals who commit no offence
in their country of nationality but engage in trafficking abroad.31
Complementarity between the Protocol 
and the UN 2001 Conference
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Considerations for the UN 2001 Conference
The importance of agreeing controls on arms brokers within the framework of the Firearms
Protocol cannot be overstated. While it is expected that the UN 2001 Conference will discuss
the issue of controlling arms brokers, early indications suggest that an agreement on legally
binding controls is considered premature. In preparation for the Conference, the United Nations
Department for Disarmament Affairs (UN DDA) has commissioned a study to investigate the
feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade in small arms to manufacturers and dealers
authorised by states. However, it is expected that this specially convened UN Group of
Governmental Experts will only agree a definition of arms brokers and outline the nature 
and scope of the problem prior to the 2001 meeting.32 If, however, the Protocol retains its
encouragement to states to adopt effective controls on arms brokers, a further UN study could
develop proposals for implementing these systems. In addition, the UN DDA could further
contribute to the international effort to control arms brokers, and could assist governments 
in enforcing the international standards, by compiling a publicly available list of those arms
brokering agents that are known to have violated arms embargoes.33
Complementarity between the Protocol 
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Relating the Protocol to the UN 2001 Conference
It is acknowledged that whatever the outcomes of the Firearms Protocol, its successful conclusion
represents an important milestone in the international effort to combat small arms proliferation
and misuse. The prospect of developing any international standards on the illicit trafficking 
of firearms, let alone legally-binding controls, was inconceivable just a few years ago, yet 
it is now set to become a reality. The Firearms Protocol is an invaluable opportunity to secure
far-reaching controls on small arms and light weapons, yet there remain concerns that this
opportunity will not be seized, as states may elect to take a narrow approach to combating
illicit firearms trafficking which will fail to fully address the complexity of the problem.
Many states maintain a distance between the Firearms Protocol and the UN 2001 Conference,
arguing that the Protocol is a law enforcement measure whilst the Conference will address
arms control and disarmament. However, these distinctions may be, in practice, arbitrary,
brought about, in part, by divisions of duty between different government and UN departments.
In reality the two processes are inextricably linked. The Protocol will clearly affect the UN 2001
Conference: omissions in the Protocol should be addressed; and standards and controls 
on commercial transactions will need to be replicated for government-authorised transfers.
A minimalist approach to the Protocol would be regrettable. If states adopt a narrow approach
during the Protocol negotiations it can only be hoped that this may galvanize efforts to agree
concrete and progressive controls within the framework of the UN 2001 Conference. At the
same time, tough choices will have to be made to ensure that the Conference is not dominated
by attempts to close loopholes or omissions with the Protocol. For instance, if the Protocol
adopts a restrictive definition of ‘firearms’, valuable time at the Conference could be taken up
with agreeing controls on exempt categories of weaponry.
While it is important that it moves beyond the controls outlined within the final Protocol, 
the 2001 Conference should seek to build on the international norms and standards which
have been developed during the course of these negotiations. If a restrictive Protocol is agreed,
states must focus on developing the following concrete measures in areas which eluded
consensus within the Protocol.
Adopt parallel controls on marking, licensing and record-keeping 
for state-to-state transactions
The draft Protocol contains detailed provisions for increasing controls on the commercial
shipment of firearms; it sets high common standards for harmonising licensing systems,
record-keeping and end-use certification; and it outlines concrete controls for a harmonised
system of marking firearms at manufacture and import. States cannot ignore the urgent need
to adopt the same standards on state-to-state transactions, they should therefore agree 
to develop the same legally binding standards for government-authorised transfers. Given the
fact that the details of such procedures will already have been elaborated and agreed during
the Protocol, this would appear to be an area where the Conference negotiators could secure
a swift and concrete outcome.
Agree legally binding controls on arms brokers, traders and forwarders
The Protocol has opened up international discussions on the global problem of arms brokers
and shipping agents. Every effort should then be made to agree to negotiate a legally binding
convention which requires arms brokering agents to register with their country of nationality
and to obtain a license from these authorities for each transaction. These controls could be
included as an amendment to the Firearms Protocol; alternatively controls on arms brokering
agents could be adopted as a separate protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime.34
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Relating the Protocol to the UN 2001 Conference
Agree on a norm of destruction of seizures of illicit weapons
Collection, safe storage and destruction of weaponry is expected to be a major item at the
2001 Conference. As the Protocol looks likely to establish destruction of seizures of illicit weapons
as an international norm, the 2001 Conference should complement this by agreeing to ensure
mandatory destruction for all illicit small arms and light weapons captured, seized or surrendered
as part of broader discussions on the safe disposal of military and police surplus and weapons
collected during peacekeeping operations.
The conclusion of a far-reaching Protocol, incorporating the provisions proposed earlier,
would reinforce the UN 2001 Conference process. The agreement of high international
norms and standards on arms brokering, destruction, marking and licensing would send 
an unequivocal message to the international community that efforts to control small arms
have moved beyond discussions quantifying the problem to concrete international mechanisms
for combating it. The UN 2001 Conference could further develop commitments such as those
made in the Protocol and agree to a progressive and comprehensive package of norms,
standards and controls that is so urgently required.
The aim of this briefing has not been to outline the range of controls which could be feasibly
be addressed by the 2001 Conference.35 Rather, it seeks to identify areas which could
complement, reinforce and enhance the provisions outlined in the Protocol. Accordingly, 
if a broad Protocol is agreed, the 2001 Conference should consider the following measures.
Review the prospects for ratification and implementation of the Protocol
Even if the Protocol achieves a far-reaching consensus, resource constraints could hamper
its full implementation. Ratification and implementation of the Protocol will undoubtedly 
be time consuming and costly for many states.36 The Protocol depends on strong national
structures to ratify, implement and co-ordinate policies. However, many developing countries
lack the capacity for proper enforcement, and so implementation may be problematic.
Moreover, in states in conflict or in the process of post-conflict reconstruction, introducing
new legislation or institutionalising provisions on record-keeping, identification and information
exchange would demand a considerable investment of human and financial resources.
In order to deal with new requirements imposed by the Protocol, states will need to ensure
there is adequate capacity within their police, customs and other national law enforcement
agencies and structures. This process will depend upon the provision of a significant level 
of technical and financial assistance to many countries. The Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime does contain provisions which encourage states to provide technical and
financial assistance to developing countries seeking to implement the Convention and its
Protocols. It further calls on States Parties to make “adequate and regular voluntary contributions
to an account specifically designated to that purpose in a United Nations funding mechanism.”37
However, this provision is vague and will require prompt substantiation by wealthier countries.
Failure to develop a concrete strategy for providing the resources necessary for effective
implementation could render the Protocol virtually meaningless, in practice. It would be 
a serious failure if governments were to negotiate a far-reaching agreement, only to have 
it fail through lack of financial commitment.
The UN 2001 Conference can play a key role in addressing these concerns. Although, at time
of writing, the exact scope of the 2001 Conference agenda has yet to be agreed, issues such
as marking, tracing and record-keeping, and strengthening export procedures and border controls
are likely to fall within its remit. Accordingly, securing specific commitments from states to fund
the implementation of the Protocol may well be an issue that can be addressed during the
2001 Conference.
A broad
Protocol
Relating the Protocol to the UN 2001 Conference
Define illicit trafficking according to international law
As outlined earlier, the Protocol currently does not apply to state authorised weapons transfers,
defining illicit trafficking as any transfer which “any one of the State Parties concerned does
not authorize”.38 Accordingly, governments could potentially engage in activities that are deemed
illicit for private citizens. This approach may serve as a convenient avenue for securing broad
agreement, but it eliminates consideration of the role that government authorised transfers 
of weapons play in prolonging conflicts and fostering a culture of violence. With conflict and
instability pervasive in regions around the world, stricter controls on state authorised transfers
are urgently required.
The 2001 Conference provides an excellent opportunity to address this concern. The Conference
is mandated to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons “in all its aspects”.
This should allow for discussion of illicit trafficking in its broader sense. The 1996 UN Guidelines
and the 1997 UN Small Arms Panel Report defined “illicit trafficking” as "international trade 
in conventional arms which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law".39
This broader interpretation provides an avenue for greater scrutiny of government-to-government
weapons transfers. Under international customary law, a state cannot lawfully authorise 
arms transfers to a recipient if they know that the proposed transfer will be used to commit
international crimes (e.g. slavery, apartheid, genocide, serious breaches of the right of peoples
and nations to self-determination) or crimes by individuals covered by international law 
(e.g. crimes against humanity, war crimes). The responsibility of states to observe existing
international law must apply equally to all transfers – including state-to-state transfers, 
state-to-non-state transactions or transfers for purposes of national security. Although
governments may wish to exempt these transfers, international law dictates that transfers
likely to be used in the commission of internationally wrongful acts, whether by state or 
non-state actors, are by definition illegal.
Complementing the licensing and record-keeping provisions of the Protocol for those of
government-authorised transfers of firearms, as outlined, although essential, is not, in itself,
enough. The 2001 Conference should agree international criteria – based on the principles
enshrined in international law – to increase restraint and responsibility governing arms exports.40
Establishing international norms and standards governing the authorised trade in small arms
and light weapons would thus be a crucial beginning and an important achievement for the
UN 2001 Conference.
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Conclusion
The signing of the UN Firearms Protocol will not be the panacea to all the problems associated
with small arms proliferation and misuse. Complementary measures, which embed small arms
control within the context of human security, security sector reform, post conflict reconstruction
and long term sustainable development must be pursued, if the Protocol is to have an impact
on “the well-being of peoples, their social and economic development and their right to live 
in peace”.41 The UN 2001 Conference will provide states with an opportunity to pursue a more
integrated approach to small arms control.
However, the UN Firearms Protocol does represent a significant step forward in developing
international consensus on the need to combat illicit trafficking and manufacturing, and this
agreement must be regarded as a central part of the global effort to combat the proliferation
and misuse of small arms and light weapons. States must not draw false distinctions between
the Protocol and the 2001 Conference. Although they have been negotiated separately the
problems which underpin small arms proliferation and misuse are common to both. Those
individuals, groups and indeed governments, which use and persistently misuse small arms
and light weapons do not discriminate between a weapon from a commercial dealer or one from
a state arsenal. Neither do their victims. If governments are genuinely committed to combating
the devastation wrought by small arms they must work together, towards cooperative,
comprehensive and integrated solutions.
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